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We investigate the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution using coherent states
and reverse reconciliation against Gaussian individual attacks based on an optimal Gaussian 1 → 2
cloning machine. We provide an implementation of the optimal Gaussian individual attack. We
also find a Bell-measurement attack which works without delayed choice of measurements and has
better performance than the cloning attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanical properties of physical systems
make it possible to implement physically secure communi-
cation between distant parties, whereas it is impossible to
achieve such a task only by the transmission of classical
signals. An interesting and actively investigated problem
of the so-called quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols
is how to achieve the secret-key sharing using imperfect
semi-classical signals and devices [1]. One of the standard
approaches is to implement photonic qubits by weak co-
herent states. QKD protocols have also been proposed
based on quantum continuous-variable (CV) systems via
coherent states [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. One of the central ideas in
CV QKD is that the legitimate receiver (Bob) of the sig-
nal measures one of the conjugate quadratures randomly,
although an exception is found [6]. There are two different
types of CV-QKD protocols called postselection [2, 3] and
reverse reconciliation (RR). In the RR protocol [5], the
sender (Alice) of the signal infers the measurement results
of Bob to share the key.
In the classical picture, an amplifier (AMP) followed by
a beam splitter (BS) provides perfect copies of the signal.
Thus an eavesdropper (Eve) can obtain a perfect copy
without making any disturbance on the signal. Then, by
repeating this process, Eve can obtain arbitrary number of
identical copies and characterize the signal with a desired
resolution. In quantum theory, the amplification comes
with spontaneous noise [7]. Thus the copies are imperfect
and Eve’s intervention can be detected due to the distur-
bance. In addition to this, her knowledge about the signal
is limited by the imperfection in the copies.
In CV systems, the AMP-followed-by-BS scheme pro-
vides an optimal Gaussian 1 → 2 cloning machine which
makes the best approximate copies of Gaussian states [8].
The impossibility of the cloning is sometimes connected
with the security of QKD. Because a cloner makes a con-
crete example of eavesdropping attacks which always in-
duces disturbance on the original system, one may think
that the security against the best cloning attack is a good
measure of QKD performance. However, the conditions
of the optimal cloning and optimal eavesdropping attack
are in general different. The optimal cloner provides two
imperfect copies and one imperfect phase-conjugate-like
state of the input called the anticlone. In the cloning at-
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tack, Eve keeps one of the imperfect copies from which she
intends to distill information, and discards the anticlone.
It is natural to consider that Eve can perform a better
attack by combining the clone-anticlone pair.
In connection with the clone-anticlone pair, there may
exist several interesting quantum operations. For exam-
ple, it is possible for Eve to erase the signal information
and cancel the amplification noise by properly perform-
ing a Bell measurement on the clone-anticlone pair and
displacing the other clone according to the measurement
outcome as in CV quantum teleportation, although in this
case Eve obtains no signal information [9]. It is also known
that quadrature signals can be efficiently encoded by using
the phase conjugate pair of coherent states |α〉⊗|α∗〉 com-
pared with the normal pair |α〉 ⊗ |α〉 [10]. This suggests
that Eve can also read the quadrature signal efficiently
from the clone-anticlone pair. A variant of cloning ma-
chines that works with the phase-conjugate input has also
been proposed [11].
In this paper, we consider the security of CV QKD us-
ing coherent states and RR [5] against the cloning attack
and its natural extensions, where, in addition to the clone,
Eve also keeps and utilizes the anticlone. We show that
an optimization of this attack corresponds to the opti-
mal Gaussian individual attack [5, 12]. The realization of
the optimal attack as well as that of the cloning attack
seems to be impossible within the present technology be-
cause the attacks need a quantum memory to store the
quantum signal for a sufficiently long time. We find a
Bell-measurement attack which works without a quantum
memory and has better performance than the cloning at-
tack.
II. EVE’S STRATEGY
Let us consider a three-mode bosonic system and the
quantum circuit including an AMP and two BSs as in
Fig. 1. Alice prepares her state on the mode a which
is the input mode of the cloner. Eve uses the ancillary
modes b for the second clone and c for the AMP.
Eve’s operation is as follows: First, Eve amplifies the
input of the mode a with the ancillary mode c. Next, Eve
combines the amplified mode a′ and the other ancillary
mode b by a BS with the transmission cos2 φ. One of the
outgoing clones (clone 1) on the mode a′′ is received by
Bob, and the other clone (clone 2) on the mode b′ is kept
by Eve. After Eve learns Bob’s measurement basis, she
combines the anticlone on the mode c′, which comes from
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FIG. 1: Eve’s attack is based on the Gaussian cloning machine
which is constructed by a linear amplifier (AMP) followed by
a beam splitter (BS).
the ancillary mode of the AMP, and the clone 2 by a BS
with the transmission cos2 θ. Finally, Eve performs her
measurement on b′′ and c′′.
We define position quadrature and momentum quadra-
ture of mode k = {a, b, c, · · · } by
xˆk ≡ kˆ + kˆ
†
2
, pˆk ≡ kˆ − kˆ
†
2i
, (1)
where kˆ (kˆ†) is the annihilation (creation) operator of
mode k.
The transformations between modes are described by
the unitary operators
Uˆa,c(λ) ≡ eλ(aˆcˆ−aˆ
†cˆ†) (2)
for an AMP with the amplification gain g ≡ cosh2 λ ≥ 1
and
Vˆa,b(θ) ≡ eθ(aˆbˆ
†−aˆ†bˆ) (3)
for a BS with the transmission cos2 θ.
The transformations between the modes are explicitly
written as(
aˆ′
cˆ′
)
≡
(
Uˆ †a,c(λ)aˆUˆa,c(λ)
Uˆ †a,c(λ)cˆUˆa,c(λ)
)
=
(
aˆ coshλ− cˆ† sinhλ
cˆ coshλ− aˆ† sinhλ
)
= coshλ
(
1 0
0 1
)(
aˆ
cˆ
)
− sinhλ
(
0 1
1 0
)(
aˆ†
cˆ†
)
,
(4)(
aˆ′′
bˆ′
)
≡
(
Vˆ †a′,b(φ)aˆ
′Vˆa′,b(φ)
Vˆ †a′,b(φ)bˆVˆa′,b(φ)
)
=
(
cosφ − sinφ
sinφ cosφ
)(
aˆ′
bˆ
)
, (5)
(
bˆ′′
cˆ′′
)
≡
(
Vˆ †b′,c′(θ)bˆ
′Vˆb′,c′(θ)
Vˆ †b′,c′(θ)cˆ
′Vˆb′,c′(θ)
)
=
(
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)(
bˆ′
cˆ′
)
. (6)
Combining Eqs. (4),(5) and (6), we obtain the mode op-
erators of the output:

 aˆ′′bˆ′′
cˆ′′

 =

 coshλ cosφ − sinφ 0coshλ cos θ sinφ cos θ cosφ − coshλ sin θ
coshλ sin θ sinφ sin θ cosφ coshλ cos θ



 aˆbˆ
cˆ

− sinhλ

 0 0 cosφ− sin θ 0 cos θ sinφ
cos θ 0 sin θ sinφ



 aˆ†bˆ†
cˆ†

 . (7)
Note that the state of Bob’s mode a′′ is determined by λ
and φ, and does not depend on θ.
In what follows, we use an abbreviated notation
〈Fˆ 〉α ≡ c〈0|b〈0|a〈α|Fˆ |α〉a|0〉b|0〉c, (8)
where we defined the coherent state |α〉k with the ampli-
tude α of mode k = {a, b, c} by kˆ|α〉k = α|α〉k. For ex-
ample, we can write the amplitudes of the output modes
associated with the input |α〉a as
〈aˆ′′〉α = α coshλ cosφ, (9)
〈bˆ′′〉α = α coshλ cos θ sinφ+ α∗ sinhλ sin θ, (10)
〈cˆ′′〉α = α coshλ sin θ sinφ− α∗ sinhλ cos θ. (11)
From these expressions, we can see that Eve’s operation
does not couple the real and imaginary parts of quadra-
tures. This fact suggests that it is inefficient for Eve to
measure a quadrature with an angle different from the
one chosen by Bob. So we consider strategies in which
Eve measures the same quadrature as Bob chooses.
We assume that Alice and Bob have the lossy and noisy
transmission channel characterized by the line transmis-
sion η and excess noise δ, those are related to the ampli-
tude and variance of Bob’s mode a′′ by
〈aˆ′′〉α = √ηα, (12)
〈(∆xa′′ )2〉α = 〈xˆ2a′′ 〉α − 〈xˆa′′〉2α =
1
4
(1 + δ). (13)
Suppose that Eve replaces the channel with the circuit in
Fig. 1. Then, λ and φ are determined to be
tanφ =
√
1− η + δ/2
η − δ/2 , (14)
tanhλ =
√
δ/2
η
. (15)
If we take θ = 0, η = 1, and δ = 1, the circuit is the
optimal Gaussian 1→ 2 cloning machine [8]. In this case
we can see that the states of a′′ and b′′ are symmetric
clones 〈aˆ′′〉α = 〈bˆ′′〉α = α and the clone-anticlone pair has
the time-reversal relation 〈cˆ′′〉α = −α∗ = −〈aˆ′′〉∗α.
If we take θ = pi/4, η = 1, and δ = 1, we can see
that the mode operators of b′′ and c′′ almost duplicate the
3position and momentum quadrature of the input mode,
respectively:
bˆ′′ =
√
2xˆa +
1
2
bˆ− cˆ− 1
2
cˆ†, (16)
cˆ′′ =
√
2ipˆa +
1
2
bˆ+ cˆ− 1
2
cˆ†. (17)
This relation implies that by measuring xˆb′′ and pˆc′′ si-
multaneously Eve can efficiently learn the amplitude of
the input state as in the efficient coding [10]. This mea-
surement is considered to be a Bell measurement on the
modes b′ and c′. As we will show later this Bell measure-
ment leads to an efficient attack which does not need the
quantum memory to store the signal coherently.
III. REVERSE RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
AND CONDITIONAL VARIANCES
In the RR protocol, Alice sends the coherent state |α〉a
with the probability density
P (α) =
2
piVA
e
− 2
VA
|α|2
(18)
and Bob randomly measures one of the quadratures. The
density operator of the input state can be written as
ρˆ =
∫
P (α)|α〉a|0〉b|0〉cc〈0|b〈0|a〈α|d2α. (19)
For calculation of the expectation values the following
form is convenient
〈Fˆ 〉 ≡ Tr
(
Fˆ ρˆ
)
=
∫
P (α)〈Fˆ 〉αd2α. (20)
A sufficient condition for secure key distribution against
a Gaussian individual attack where Eve uses the measure-
ment result of a single mode quadrature after Bob’s basis
is declared is given by
V (xB|xA)− V (xB |xE) ≤ 0,
V (pB|pA)− V (pB|pE) ≤ 0, (21)
where the conditional variance of x given y is defined by
V (x|y) = 〈(∆x)2〉 − |〈xy〉 − 〈x〉〈y〉|
2
〈(∆y)2〉 (22)
and the variables of Alice, Bob and Eve are denoted by
the subscripts A, B and E, respectively. The conditional
variance becomes smaller as the variables become more
correlated.
Let us calculate Alice’s conditional variances, V (xB |xA)
and V (pB|pA). In our formulation, the first moment of the
quadratures is 〈xˆk〉 = 〈pˆk〉 = 0 for any k. The relevant
terms for V (xB |xA) can be written as
〈x2B〉 ≡ 〈xˆ2a′′ 〉 =
∫
P (α)〈xˆ2a′′ 〉αd2α =
1
4
(1 + ηVA + δ),
(23)
〈xAxB〉 ≡
∫
P (α)〈xαxˆa′′〉αd2α =
√
ηVA
4
, (24)
〈x2A〉 ≡
∫
P (α)x2αd
2α =
VA
4
. (25)
Note that xα ≡ α+α∗2 corresponds to Alice’s position
quadrature which is determined by Alice’s choice of the
parameter α. From Eqs. (23)-(25), we have
V (xB |xA) = 1
4
(1 + δ) . (26)
It means that Alice can predict Bob’s measurement result
within the uncertainty of the vacuum noise plus excess
noise. This is also a direct consequence of Eq. (13). Sim-
ilarly we have
V (pB|pA) = 1
4
(1 + δ) . (27)
To calculate Eve’s conditional variances, V (xB |xE) and
V (pB|pE), let us assume that Bob measures xˆa′′ and
then Eve adjusts θ and measures xˆb′′ (θ). In this case,
V (xB |xE) = V (xˆa′′ |xˆb′′(θ)). From Eqs. (7), (14), and
(15) we can write
xˆa′′ =
√
ηxˆa −
√
1− η + δ/2xˆb −
√
δ/2xˆc, (28)
xˆb′′(θ) = Xxˆa + Y xˆb + Zxˆc, (29)
where
X ≡ 1√
η − δ/2(
√
η
√
1− η + δ/2 cos θ +
√
δ/2 sin θ),
Y ≡ 1√
η − δ/2(η − δ/2) cos θ,
Z ≡ − 1√
η − δ/2(
√
η sin θ +
√
δ/2
√
1− η + δ/2 cos θ).
(30)
Then, using
〈xˆ2b〉 = 〈xˆ2c〉 =
1
4
, 〈xˆ2a〉 =
1
4
(VA + 1),
〈xˆaxˆb〉 = 〈xˆbxˆc〉 = 〈xˆcxˆa〉 = 0, (31)
we obtain
〈x2E〉 ≡ 〈xˆb′′ (θ)2〉
= X2〈xˆ2a〉+ Y 2〈xˆ2b〉+ Z2〈xˆ2c〉
=
1
4
(
X2(VA + 1) + Y
2 + Z2
)
, (32)
〈xExB〉 ≡ 〈xˆa′′ xˆb′′(θ)〉
=
√
ηX〈xˆ2a〉 − Y
√
1− η + δ/2〈xˆ2b〉 − Z
√
δ/2〈xˆ2c〉
=
1
4
(√
ηX(VA + 1)− Y
√
1− η + δ/2− Z
√
δ/2
)
.
(33)
From Eqs. (23), (32) and (33), we can write
4V (xˆa′′ |xˆb′′ (θ)) = VB|E(θ) ≡
1
4
(
1 + δ +
η
{
VA(X
2 + Y 2 + Z2 − 2XΩ)− Ω2}
(VA + 1)X2 + Y 2 + Z2
)
(34)
with
Ω ≡
(
X − Y
√
1− η + δ/2
η
− Z
√
δ
2η
)
. (35)
Since the replacement of the modes b′′ → c′′ corresponds
to the replacement θ → θ − pi/2 in Eq. (7), we can write
V (xˆa′′ |xˆc′′(θ)) = VB|E(θ − pi/2). (36)
The conditional variance of momentum quadratures can
be calculated in the same manner and we can verify
V (pˆa′′ |pˆb′′(θ)) = VB|E(−θ), (37)
V (pˆa′′ |pˆc′′(θ)) = VB|E(pi/2− θ). (38)
Using relations (34), (36), (37), and (39), we can calculate
V (xB |xE) and V (pB |pE) for various strategies taken by
Eve. From Eqs. (34) and (39), we can see that by setting
θ = pi/4 Eve can estimate both of the quadratures with
the same uncertainty simultaneously, i.e.,
V (xˆa′′ |xˆb′′ (pi/4)) = V (pˆa′′ |pˆc′′(pi/4))
= VB|E(pi/4). (39)
IV. CLONING AND GAUSSIAN INDIVIDUAL ATTACKS
In this section, we investigate the security condition (21) for the following four attacks. Firstly, we consider two
simple attacks where Eve uses either the clone 2 or the anticlone. We call them the cloning attack and the anticloning
attack, respectively. Next, we consider two attacks where Eve uses both the clone 2 and the anticlone. In one attack,
Eve does not use the quantum memory and performs a Bell measurement. In the other attack Eve optimizes θ in order
to minimize her conditional variance.
A. Cloning attack
We assume that Eve utilizes only the mode b′ (clone 2). In this case, V (xB |xE) = V (xˆa′′ |xˆb′) and V (pB|pE) =
V (pˆa′′ |pˆb′). Using the relations xˆb′ = xˆb′′ (0), pˆb′ = pˆb′′(0), (34), and (37), we obtain
V (xB |xE) = V (pB|pE) = VB|E(0) =
δ + 2(1 + VA)η
δ2 + δ{1 + (VA − 2)η}+ 2η{1 + VA(1 − η)} . (40)
The security condition (21) requires
η ≥ ηclone ≡ δ
4VA(1 + δ)
{
(3 + δ)VA − 2δ +
√
{(3 + δ)VA + 2δ}2 + 16VA
}
=
δ(3 + δ)
4(1 + δ)
{
1− δ
(3 + δ)VA
+
√
1 +
4δ
(3 + δ)VA
+
16VA + 4δ2
(3 + δ)2V 2A
}
. (41)
B. Anticloning attack
We assume that Eve utilizes only the mode c′ (anticlone). In this case, V (xB |xE) = V (xˆa′′ |xˆc′) and V (pB|pE) =
V (pˆa′′ |pˆc′). Using the relations xˆc′ = xˆb′′ (pi/2), pˆc′ = pˆb′′(pi/2), (34), and (37), we obtain
V (xB |xE) = V (pB|pE) = VB|E(pi/2) = 1 + δ −
(4 + 3VA)δ − 2VAη
(1 + VA)δ + 2η
. (42)
We can write the security condition as
η ≥ ηanticlone ≡ (4 + 3VA)δ
2VA
=
(
2
VA
+
3
2
)
δ. (43)
5C. Bell measurement attack without delayed choice
As we have seen in the ends of Sec. II and III, Eve may perform a Bell measurement on the clone-anticlone pair without
using any quantum memory. Suppose that Eve’s operation is as follows: Eve fixes θ = pi/4 so that the contributions of
the mode a to the modes b′′ and c′′ become equivalent. She performs position-quadrature measurement on the mode
b′′ and momentum-quadrature measurement on the mode c′′ right after she received the state. She chooses one of the
measurement results after she learns Bob’s choice of the quadratures. We call this attack the Bell measurement attack
(BMA). In this case, V (xB |xE) = V (xˆa′′ |xˆb′′ (pi/4)) and V (pB|pE) = V (pˆa′′ |pˆc′′(pi/4)). Thanks to the relation (39), we
can estimate Eve’s conditional variances by
VB|E(pi/4) = 1 +
VA(2η − δ)2
δ2 + 2(VA + 2)
√
2ηδ(1− η + δ/2) + δ{VA + 2 + (VA − 2)η}+ 2η{2 + VA(1− η)}
.
(44)
The security condition becomes
η ≥ ηBMA ≡
2δ
(
VA + 1− δ/2 +
√
(VA + 2)(VA − δ)
)
VA(2 + δ)
=
2δ
2 + δ
(
1 +
1− δ/2
VA
+
√
1 +
2− δ
VA
− 2δ
V 2A
)
. (45)
D. Optimal Gaussian individual attack
In our formulation, Eve’s optimal strategy is to select θ
in order to minimize her conditional variance. The mini-
mum value of VB|E is given by
VB|E(θopt) =
1 + VA
(1 + VA)(1 + δ)− ηVA (46)
with
θopt ≡ tan−1
√
ηδ(2 + VA)√
2− 2η + δ{VA(η − δ)− δ}
,
(−pi/2 < θopt < pi/2). (47)
Eve can achieve the optimal value for each quadrature
by measuring xˆb′′(θopt) or pˆb′′(−θopt) according to Bob’s
choice, position or momentum quadrature, respectively;
V (xB |xE) = V (xˆa′′ |xˆb′′(θopt)) = VB|E(θopt)
V (pB |pE) = V (pˆa′′ |pˆb′′(−θopt)) = VB|E(θopt). (48)
The value VB|E(θopt) corresponds to the lower bound of
Eve’s conditional variance which saturates the Heisenberg-
type uncertainty relation [5, 12, 13] and thus the optimiza-
tion of our scheme gives an implementation of the optimal
Gaussian individual attack. Another implementation of
the optimal Gaussian individual attack is found in [12].
The security condition can be written as
η ≥ ηopt ≡ 1 + VA
VA
δ(2 + δ)
(1 + δ)
. (49)
In the high-modulation limit (VA →∞), we have
VB|E(θopt) →
1
1 + δ − η ,
θopt → tan−1
√
ηδ√
2− 2η + δ(η − δ) . (50)
E. Discussion
In Fig. 2, we show the curves given by η = ηopt,
η = ηBMA, η = ηanticlone, and η = ηclone at the high-
modulation limit (VA → ∞). For each attack, the secu-
rity condition is satisfied below the curve. We also show
a necessary condition of CV QKD using coherent states
[14, 15]: η > δ/2. This bound is given by an intercept-
resend attack based on the simultaneous measurement of
the quadratures and can be also derived from the sepa-
rable condition of CV systems [12, 13]. Above this curve
secure key distribution is impossible.
From Fig. 2 we can see that the anticloning attack is
better than the cloning attack and BMA is better than
the anticloning attack at the high-modulation limit. This
order is conserved in the case of finite modulation provided
VA ≥ δ and δ ≤ 2/3, i.e., from Eqs. (41), (43), (45) and
(49) we can verify
ηopt ≥ ηBMA ≥ ηanticlone ≥ ηclone. (51)
It shows that the cloning attack is the weakest attack
among the four. The fact that the cloning attack is weaker
than the anticloning attack seems to be counter-intuitive
because the amplitude of the clone 2 is always larger than
that of the anticlone if δ ≤ 2η, i.e.,∣∣∣∣∣ 〈bˆ
′〉α
〈cˆ′〉α
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1. (52)
An interpretation of the result is as follows: One can show
that the clone 1 and clone 2 are not entangled but in a
mixture of coherent states [15]. Thus the bipartite sys-
tem cannot make stronger correlations between any two
of the quadratures beyond the vacuum fluctuation. On
the other hand, since the amplified mode and anticlone
mode, a′ and c′, are entangled due to the process of the
AMP, it is possible to make stronger correlations between
the quadrature of them beyond the vacuum fluctuation.
This leads to a smaller conditional variance.
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FIG. 2: The security condition is shown for the line transmis-
sion η and quadrature excess noise δ in the high-modulation
limit (VA → ∞). The dash-dotted line is for the cloning at-
tack, the dotted line is for the anticloning attack, the dashed
line is for the Bell-measurement attack, and the solid line is for
the optimal Gaussian individual attack. The dot-dash-dotted
line is for the intercept-resend attack which gives a necessary
condition of CV QKD using coherent states [14, 15].
Relation (51) also shows that the clone-anticlone pair
without delayed choice of measurements provides a better
attack than either of the cloning and anticloning attacks.
This implies the utility of the phase-conjugate pair [9, 10,
11].
In the high-modulation and high-loss limit (VA ≫ 1
and, η ≪ 1), from Eqs. (41), (43), (45), and (49) we can
see that the cloning and anticloning attacks provide nearly
the same security bound
ηclone ∼ ηanticlone ∼ 3
2
δ, (53)
and that BMA provides nearly optimal bound:
ηBMA ∼ ηopt ∼ 2δ. (54)
The existence of such an effective attack without delayed
choice of measurements is interesting and it seems to be
a characteristic of CV QKD using coherent states. In
general, indirect measurement is considered to be pow-
erful because Eve can use a quantum memory and she
can perform her measurement after she learns Bob’s mea-
surement basis. If Eve cannot use the quantum memory
she has to measure different quantities simultaneously to
infer the signal because she does not know the basis. Gen-
erally the simultaneous measurement of non-commutable
observables costs additional noise and indirect measure-
ment without delayed choice seems to be inefficient. How-
ever, in our case of the CV QKD under realistic condi-
tion, the difference between with and without the quan-
tum memory is not significant as shown above. From prac-
tical aspect BMA should be considered seriously because
it means that a very efficient attack can be realized with-
out advanced technologies.
V. SUMMARY
We have investigated the security of CV QKD using
coherent states and reverse reconciliation against individ-
ual Gaussian attacks based on an optimal Gaussian 1→2
cloning machine. We have assumed that one of the clones
is delivered to Bob and Eve combines the other clone and
the anticlone using a BS and performs quadrature mea-
surements. In this approach, we can connect and analyze
different individual Gaussian attacks just by changing the
parameter of the BS.
We found an efficient individual attack which works
without delayed choice of measurements and has bet-
ter performance than either of the cloning and anti-
cloning attacks. The operation of this attack provides
a simultaneous-measurement scheme which leaves an im-
perfect copy. In other words, it provides a way to perform
a simultaneous measurement of the quadratures indirectly
so that the measurement induced noise corresponds to a
given value. In the high-loss and high-modulation limit,
we showed that the security bound given by this attack is
nearly the same as the one given by the optimal Gaussian
individual attack. We also found that the optimization of
the BS parameter with a delayed choice of measurements
provides an implementation of the optimal Gaussian indi-
vidual attack.
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